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GOD’S IMPOSSIBLE OPTIONS
Kenneth L. Pearce

According to Michael Almeida, reflections on free will and possibility can
be used to show that the existence of an Anselmian God is compatible with
the existence of evil. These arguments depend on the assumption that an
agent can be free with respect to an action only if it is possible that that agent
performs that action. Although this principle enjoys some intuitive support, I argue that Anselmianism undermines these intuitions by introducing
impossible options. If Anselmianism is true, I argue, then both God and creatures may be free to do the impossible.

In a number of publications,1 Michael Almeida has argued that the conjunction of Anselmian theism with the possibility of creaturely free will
entails that possibly God actualizes a world containing moral evil. The
argument can be reconstructed as follows:
1. Necessarily, whatever world is actual has been actualized by God.
2. Possibly, some creatures possess morally significant freedom.
3. Necessarily, if some creatures possess morally significant freedom,
then possibly some creatures commit moral wrongs.2
4. Therefore, possibly God actualizes a world at which some creatures
commit moral wrongs.
Given standard assumptions about modal logic and possible worlds, the
argument is valid.3 According to Almeida, this argument provides the
1
The argument is clearest and most explicit in Almeida, “Bringing About Perfect Worlds.”
Also see Almeida, Freedom, God, and Worlds, ch. 5; Almeida, “Compatibilism and the Free Will
Defense,” Almeida, “On Necessary Gratuitous Evils.”
2
To avoid ambiguity, this sentence can be formulated in symbols as follows: ☐(MSF →
◊WRONG), where “MSF” is read as “some creatures possess morally significant freedom”
and “WRONG” is read as “some creatures commit moral wrongs.”
3
Proof: by contraposition, 3 is equivalent to ☐(¬◊WRONG → ¬MSF). By the distribution axiom, this entails ☐¬◊WRONG → ☐¬MSF. But by the definition of “◊” 2 is equivalent
to ¬☐¬MSF. Hence, by modus tollens, we have ¬☐¬◊WRONG, i.e., by the definition of “◊,”
◊◊WRONG. Either S4 or S5 allows the simplification of this sentence to ◊WRONG, i.e., there
is a possible world at which some creatures commit moral wrongs. However, by premise
1, any possible world is possibly actualized by God. Therefore, possibly, God actualizes a
world at which some creatures commit moral wrongs.
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Anselmian theist with a defense against the logical problem of evil which
does not rely on controversial assumptions about free will:4 the premises
(Almeida claims) are mutually compatible and jointly entail that possibly
God coexists with evil. Almeida also suggests that this line of argument
solves the problem of divine freedom, by showing that God has alternative possibilities.5
The Anselmian theist is, by definition, committed to premise 1. Morally
significant freedom is freedom with respect to at least some actions such
that either doing them is morally wrong or refraining from doing them is
morally wrong. Since we ordinarily take ourselves actually to possess such
freedom, premise 2 is extremely plausible. Further, Almeida points out,
even philosophers who take freedom to be compatible with causal determination (and/or divine determination) generally take freedom to be incompatible with metaphysical necessitation.6 After all, no one can be free to draw
a round square or to create water that contains no hydrogen. Accordingly,
premise 3 is also extremely plausible, even on compatibilist views.
Almeida’s argument is valid and Anselmian theists have good reason to
accept each of its premises. One might think that this is all there is to being a
good argument. Yet, having admitted all this, I propose to show that this is
not a good argument—at least not for Almeida’s purposes. This is because
the Anselmian premise 1 undermines the intuitions that support premise 3.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 1, I argue that the
Anselmian is committed to the claim that among God’s options are some
impossibilities. In section 2, I argue that this does not imply the incoherent
claim that possibly God does the impossible. In section 3, I argue that, if God
has impossible options, then it is possible that creatures have impossible
options. Further, if the presence of impossible options for doing evil is
sufficient for God to have morally significant freedom, it ought to be sufficient for us as well, contrary to Almeida’s premise 3. I conclude, in section
4, by raising what I call “the Anselmian problem of evil”: if Anselmianism
is true then it appears that this world should be among God’s impossible
options, and not among the possible ones. Almeida’s strategy does nothing to dispel this appearance.
1. Anselmianism and Impossible Options
Anselmianism is the view that, necessarily, a maximally great being (God)
exists, and, necessarily, whatever world is actual is actualized by God.7
Actualization is an explanatory relation: to say that a world is actualized

Almeida, “Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense.”
Almeida, Freedom, God, and Worlds, §7.0; Almeida, “Bringing About Perfect Worlds,”
208–209.
6
See, e.g., Leibniz, Theodicy, §§34–35, 43–46; Lewis, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?”;
Vihvelin, Causes, Laws, and Free Will.
7
This is a stipulative definition, not a claim about the historical Anselm. I take it this is
roughly the way Almeida uses the term “Anselmianism” as well.
4
5
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by God is to say (in part) that it is because of God’s choice that this world,
rather than some other world, is actual.
Anselmians hold a variety of views about how precisely God’s creative
decision works. However, all Anselmians agree that the explanatory order
in all possible worlds begins with God. Proponents of strong providence
hold that God selects one precise world to be actual. Anselmians who
reject strong providence hold that God’s creative choice fixes some range
of worlds as candidates for actuality, with creaturely free choices (and perhaps other indeterministic events) being needed to determine which of
those candidates is actual. What we mean in saying that necessarily whatever world is actual is actualized by God is just that God plays this foundational explanatory role.8
No matter what world was actual, according to the Anselmian, it would
have been actual because of God’s choice. However, there are some consistently
describable states of affairs such that, necessarily, a maximally great being
does not actualize a world containing them. It follows that some consistently
describable states of affairs are impossible because, and only because, necessarily God does not choose to actualize a world containing them. It is in this
sense that the Anselmian God is the “delimiter of possibilities.”9
Note that this line of thought does not depend on strong providence.
Even open theists will generally admit that there are some states of
affairs—for instance, an innocent person being condemned to hell10—such that
8
Thus, throughout this paper, I use “actualize” to mean roughly what Plantinga—and
Almeida following him—calls “weak actualization” (Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 172–173;
Almeida, Freedom, God, and Worlds, 56–57; Almeida, “Unrestricted Actualization,” 213–214).
However, I find Plantinga’s way of distinguishing between strong and weak actualization
problematic. According to Plantinga (and Almeida) an agent strongly actualizes those states
of affairs she causes to be actual, and (merely) weakly actualizes those she actualizes without
causing. I have elsewhere argued that God should be understood as the ground, rather than
the cause, of the universe (“Foundational Grounding”; “Counterpossible Dependence”).
Hence, on Plantinga’s definitions, my view would be one in which God does not strongly
actualize anything. Insofar as the distinction between strong and weak actualization is supposed to be doing philosophical work regarding free will and the problem of evil, this seems
like the wrong result.
9
Morris, Anselmian Explorations, 47–48. Linda Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and
Foreknowledge, 111–113 takes this observation to motivate the rejection of S4 (which would
invalidate Almeida’s argument). However, once we have admitted that there are consistently
describable states of affairs such that, necessarily, God chooses contrary to them, I do not see
why we should not admit that God’s choosing contrary to them is necessarily necessary, as
required by S4.
10
Condemning the innocent is used by Leibniz (“Observations on the Book Concerning
‘the Origin of Evil,’” §21) as an example of something obviously inconsistent with the divine
nature. The example also appears in Pruss, “Divine Creative Freedom,” §V.4. I take no position, in the present paper, on the controversial question of whether condemning unrepentant
sinners to hell is consistent with the divine nature. On this question, see Adams, “Hell and
the God of Justice”; Talbott, “The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment”; Kvanvig, The Problem
of Hell; Sider, “Hell and Vagueness”; Hershenov, “The Fairness of Hell.” The question of
whether it is consistent with Anselmianism that there should ever be any sinners in the first
place will be discussed in §4, below.
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a necessarily existent and essentially perfectly good God would necessarily ensure that they do not become actual.
This much is widely accepted by Anselmian theists.11 However, it has
a consequence that Anselmians have not frequently emphasized or made
explicit. Say that a state of affairs is among an agent’s options iff: (a) in choosing what to do, the agent takes reasons for and/or against that state of affairs
into account,12 and (b) whether the state of affairs becomes actual depends
explanatorily on the agent’s choice.13 (I will also sometimes speak of an action
being among an agent’s options. The definition is precisely analogous.)
To say that a state of affairs depends explanatorily on an agent’s choice
is to say that it is because of the agent’s choice that the state of affairs is
either actual or not. For instance, supposing I raise my hand, clause (b) is
satisfied if my raising my hand is explained by my choosing to raise my
hand. Supposing I do not raise my hand, clause (b) is satisfied if my not
raising my hand is explained by my not choosing to raise my hand.14
I assume that having an action among one’s options, in the sense
defined, is necessary, though perhaps insufficient, for being free with
respect to that action.15 The relevance of options to freedom will be discussed in more detail in section 3, below. Our present question is, which
states of affairs are among God’s options?
Regardless of one’s particular views about providence and free will,
it follows from the basic Anselmian assumption that every possible state
of affairs satisfies clause (b) with respect to God. Even if (as the denier of
strong providence holds) God only selects a family of candidate worlds,
rather than one precise world, still every actual contingent state of affairs
is actual because of God’s choice. For instance, even if God did not determine me to write this paper, it is partly because of God’s creative choice
that the state of affairs my writing this paper is actual: God chose that the
universe should exist, that it should have the laws it does, etc., having at
least the knowledge that it might lead to my writing this paper. Further,
God certainly knew how to prevent my writing this paper if God so chose.
Regardless of whether the Anselmian endorses strong providence, it is
a core commitment of Anselmianism that every possible state of affairs
11
See, e.g., Garcia, “A Response to the Modal Problem of Evil”; Talbott, “On the Divine
Nature and the Nature of Divine Freedom”; Tidman, “The Epistemology of Evil Possibilities”;
Kraay, “Theism and Modal Collapse”; Pruss, “Divine Creative Freedom,” 231–235; Byerly,
“The All-Powerful, Perfectly Good, and Free God.” However, a few broadly Anselmian philosophers have attempted to avoid this result by denying that (the individual who is) God is
essentially morally perfect. See, e.g., Pike, “Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin”; Manis,
“Could God Do Something Evil?”; Howard-Snyder, “Divine Freedom.”
12
Reasons may be taken into account without being explicitly considered. See Pearce, “Are
We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?” 160.
13
This notion of “having an option” is borrowed from Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the
Laws of Providence?” 160.
14
Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?” 161.
15
For further discussion of this concept of “having an option” and its relation to human
freedom, see Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?”
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depends explanatorily on God, since God provides the ultimate explanation of why things are so and not otherwise.
Further, from the fact that the Anselmian God is the delimiter of possibilities, in the sense explained above, it follows that at least some impossible states of affairs depend on God’s choice in the way required by clause
(b). The innocent do not suffer in hell because God chooses to ensure that
they do not. It is impossible that the innocent suffer in hell because necessarily God chooses to ensure that they do not. Hence, at least some impossible states of affairs satisfy clause (b) with respect to God.
The Anselmian is committed to the claim that certain states of affairs
are impossible precisely because God necessarily chooses against them.
God’s necessarily choosing against them is explained by the reasons God
has against them. Thus, God takes these reasons into account in creating. It follows that these impossible states of affairs will satisfy clause (a).
These, however, are the very same impossible states of affairs—such as the
innocent suffering in hell—which, I argued above, satisfy clause (b). Hence,
at least some impossible states of affairs are among God’s options.
2. Options and Possibilities
It may be thought that the result of the previous section is incoherent, and
that we must therefore either show how the Anselsmian can avoid it or
else abandon Anselmian theism. There are two prima facie plausible principles, either of which would suffice to generate this conclusion:
1. If a state of affairs is among an agent’s options, then possibly that
agent brings about that state of affairs.
2. If a state of affairs is among an agent’s options, then possibly that
agent chooses to bring about that state of affairs.
In this section, I argue that the Anselmian has good reason to reject both
of these principles.
Principle 1 looks quite plausible in certain cases. For instance, drawing a
round square is not among my options since it is not possible that I draw a
round square. But if this principle is accepted in full generality, the position
outlined above is incoherent: for any state of affairs s, if s is among God’s
options then possibly God actualizes s. But, necessarily, if God actualizes s,
then s is actual. Possibly p and necessarily if p then q together imply possibly
q.16 Therefore, possibly s is actual. Therefore, God does not have impossible
options.
However, the plausibility of principle 1 extends only to those cases
where the intrinsic impossibility of the option explains why the agent does
16
This inference rule is symbolized: ◊p, ☐ (p → q) ⊢ ◊q. So far as I know, the validity of this
rule, involving a necessitated material conditional, is uncontested. It is implied by every version of the possible worlds model theory: if some p-world is possible, and every p-world is a
q-world, then some q-world is possible. This should not be confused with the “Strangeness of
Impossibility Condition,” a contested principle involving subjunctive conditionals. See note
41 in the Appendix, below.
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not possibly bring it about.17 This will be intuitive in human cases involving nomological possibility. Running 90 miles in an hour is not among my
options because (given how my body is constituted) it is nomologically
impossible that I do so. But consider another case. Suppose I know that a
certain cup contains concentrated bleach. It may be that, given the current
state of my mind/brain it is nomologically impossible that I intentionally
drink the contents of the cup, but this is not because of any nomological
impossibility in the action itself. Rather, it is because I see overwhelming
reason against the action, and my psychological constitution is not such as
to allow me to choose against such overwhelming reasons (at least without some strong irrational temptation on the other side). We’ve described
the action in question as an intentional, and hence chosen, action. In order
for the reasons against it to serve as an explanation of its (nomological)
impossibility (in the described circumstances), those reasons must be
weighed by an agent (me), the outcome of this weighing must depend on
those reasons, and this outcome must (nomologically) guarantee that the
action is not chosen. Hence this nomologically impossible action must be
among my options. (Before you accuse me of begging questions in the
free will debate, remember: my notion of having an option is stipulative,
I haven’t said anything about whether I am able to drink the bleach, and
I haven’t yet said anything about whether I’m free to drink the bleach. The
point is simply that my not drinking the bleach is explained by the reasons
I have for not doing so.)
The nomological impossibility of a given action would not prevent God
from performing it. If God refrains from breaking the laws of nature, it is
because God chooses to refrain. As a result, God’s refraining from breaking the laws of nature is always like my refraining from drinking bleach,
and never like my refraining from running 90 miles in an hour. In short,
the impossible options to which, I have argued, the Anselmian is committed are extrinsic impossibilities, i.e., states of affairs in their own nature
possible but necessarily not actualized by God and therefore necessarily
non-actual.18 However, principle 1 is plausible only as applied to intrinsic
impossibilities.
Similar considerations apply to principle 2. In ordinary cases it is plausible to suppose that an action is not among my options unless it is possible for me to choose it. However, this again depends on the reason for
the impossibility. Suppose I have a phobia of flying. Suppose further that
I believe about myself that if I decide to get on an airplane I will be in a
state of severe emotional agitation for the entirety of the flight, but nevertheless I will get on the plane. I therefore weigh the unpleasantness of this
experience against the importance of arriving quickly at my destination.
17
On intrinsic impossibility, see Garcia, “A Response to the Modal Problem of Evil,”
383–385.
18
But for an argument that the Anselmian should endorse a stronger view, on which even
logical contradictions are among God’s options, see the Appendix below.
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The conclusion of my deliberation is that I should take the flight. Suppose
I even successfully choose to buy the ticket. Nevertheless, it may be that,
when I actually arrive at the airport, I find it impossible to choose to walk
down the jetway and get on the plane. It is at least conceivable that the
state of my mind/brain might be such that this is a genuine nomological
impossibility. This kind of “volitional disability,” as Gary Watson19 calls it,
might actually take away my options. That is, it might either prevent me
from actually taking the reasons for and against the choice into account, or
it might prevent the outcome from depending on my choice.
But consider an alternative case. Suppose that instead of a phobia I have
a strong commitment to reducing my carbon footprint, and suppose there
is a much more environmentally friendly option that will be only a little
worse than flying with respect to time, expense, and hassle. In such a case
it might be nomologically necessary, given my psychological state (including my values and my knowledge of these facts), that unless something
interferes with my deliberation the outcome will be that I choose not to fly.
In such a case, the explanation of my necessarily not flying is found within
my process of deliberation. Thus, the explanation of why I necessarily do
not fly actually requires that flying be among my options.
The Anselmian God necessarily values things in proportion to their
goodness, necessarily knows all the facts, and could not err or be disrupted in weighing options. As a result, there will be states of affairs that,
necessarily, God does not choose. This does not prevent these states of
affairs from being among God’s options, in the sense defined.
3. Might We Have Impossible Options?
As indicated above, I assume that having an action among one’s options is
necessary, though perhaps insufficient, for being free with respect to that
action. We have seen that, for us, the nomological necessity (given certain background conditions) of choosing against a certain action need not
remove it from the menu of options. Further, we have seen that, for God,
even metaphysical necessity need not remove an action from the menu of
options. I now argue that, given Anselmianism, it is quite plausible that
ordinary creatures like us could have metaphysically impossible options.
Because an action’s being among one’s options may not be sufficient for
being free with respect to that action, this does not immediately refute
Almeida’s premise 3. However, it does undermine many of the intuitions
that motivate that premise. This is sufficient to render Almeida’s argument ineffective for its intended purpose.
3.1 Prevented Options
For the moment, let us restrict our attention to those Anselmians who
endorse theories of providence stronger than open theism. Call these
19

Agency and Answerability, ch. 4.
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philosophers providential Anselmians. The extent to which my argument
applies to open theists will be addressed in section 3.4, below.
I have previously argued that providential Anselmianism gives rise to
what I call prevented options: actions that are genuinely among an agent’s
options although God has decided to ensure that the agent does not choose
them. I have further argued that these theories are committed to the claim that
we may be free to perform actions that are among our prevented options.20
Without repeating the details of that argument, an example will suffice to
give the general idea. Suppose (to adapt a toy example from Hunt21) that
there is a game show in which the contestant chooses one of three doors and
receives the prize behind it. Suppose further that God wants to ensure that
Sue does not choose Door #1 or Door #2, but God wants to leave Sue’s free
will intact. If theological compatibilism is true,22 God can just decree that
Sue will choose Door #3, and this (according to the compatibilist) need not
interfere with Sue’s free will. If Molinism is true,23 then God knows whether
it is true that if Sue were a contestant, she would choose Door #3, and God can
ensure that Sue will not be a contestant unless this conditional is true. If the
simple foreknowledge theory of providence is true,24 then God can employ
foreknowledge of which door the contestant will choose and ensure that Sue is
the contestant if, but only if, the contestant will choose Door #3. In both the
Molinist and the simple foreknowledge case (and possibly, depending on
the details, in the compatibilist case), it is true that if Sue had not been going
to choose Door #3, she would not have been the contestant. Nevertheless, these
theories are committed to the claim that the other doors are among Sue’s
options and, indeed, that she is free to choose them.25
I call Sue’s condition in these cases finkish backtracking.26 In the literature
on dispositions and abilities, a disposition or ability is finkish if it would
Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?”
Hunt, “Prescience and Providence,” 437.
22
Theological compatibilism (as that term is used in discussions of divine providence) is
the view that creatures may be free even if God determines their choices. For defense of this
view, see McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty of God.
23
Molinism is the view that God makes providential use of knowledge of contingent but
pre-volitional counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. For defense of this view see Flint, Divine
Providence.
24
By “the simple foreknowledge theory of providence,” I mean the conjunction of the
following three theses: (a) God makes providential use of simple knowledge of the actual
future; (b) God does not make providential use of simple knowledge of counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom; and (c) this allows God greater providential control than God would
have without using simple knowledge of the actual future. By “simple knowledge” I mean
knowledge not inferred from anything else. For defense of this view see Hunt, “Divine
Providence and Simple Foreknowledge”; Hunt, “Prescience and Providence.” Insofar as this
is a theory of providence, it is not an account of what knowledge God has but rather an
account of what knowledge God uses providentially. If God has additional knowledge that is
“screened off” from providential use, this is not relevant here.
25
For a detailed defense of the claims made in this paragraph, see Pearce, “Are We Free to
Break the Laws of Providence?”
26
Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?” 163–164.
20
21
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be lost if the conditions for its exercise occurred.27 Finkish backtracking
occurs when an ability or disposition is such that if it had been going to be
exercised it never would have been possessed in the first place. Prevented
options generally involve finkish backtracking, and theories of providence
stronger than open theism give rise to them.
3.2 From Prevented Options to Impossible Options
There are some outcomes that are so bad that, necessarily, the Anselmian
God prevents them. There are consistently describable states of affairs that
involve such outcomes being brought about by the free actions of creatures, and there are consistently describable states of affairs that involve
creatures freely deciding not to bring about such outcomes. Any version of
Anselmianism is committed to the claim that the former states of affairs,
though consistent, are metaphysically impossible. However, if prevented
options are possible, then the latter states of affairs should be possible. For
instance, it is consistent with Anselmianism to suppose that God should
allow some creature to choose whether the innocent should suffer in hell,
provided God ensures that that creature will choose not to condemn the
innocent.28
Suppose that God delegates to some creature (call him “Charon”) this
task of judgment, and suppose someone offers Charon a bribe to condemn
an innocent person. Charon, let us suppose, rejects the bribe because
he correctly recognizes the moral value of just judgment and sees that
upholding this value is inconsistent with accepting the bribe. In this case,
does Charon have the option of accepting the bribe and condemning the
innocent?
In order for Charon to have this option, two conditions would need to
be satisfied: (a) in making his choice, Charon must take reasons for and/
or against the action into account, and (b) whether Charon performs the
action must depend explanatorily on his choice.
Because Charon acts for a reason in rejecting the bribe, condition (a)
is clearly satisfied. Condition (b), however, is much more complex. Since
God has entrusted Charon with the task of judgment, we would expect the

27
See Martin, “Dispositions and Conditionals”; Lewis, “Finkish Dispositions”; Vihvelin,
Causes, Laws, and Free Will, §6.3.
28
Tom Flint’s Molinist defenses of the Incarnation (Flint, “‘A Death He Freely Accepted’”)
and of Papal infallibility (Flint, Divine Providence, ch. 8) both exhibit precisely the same structure as the case I am envisioning here: free will is retained although it would be inconsistent
with God’s character to place that individual in that circumstance if that individual had been
going to choose badly. Flint explicitly endorses (and attributes to Molina) the view “that
there is no possible world in which an assumed human nature [i.e., one in which God is
incarnate] sins” (“A Death He Freely Accepted,” 8–9). Similarly, Flint assumes that, because
of God’s essential perfect goodness, “Filbert’s [or anyone else’s] election to the papacy entails
[i.e., metaphysically necessitates] that he doesn’t freely reject God’s guidance and proclaim
heresy” (Divine Providence, 188), an assumption that leads to certain technical problems
which Flint discusses at some length.

194

Faith and Philosophy

conditional if Charon condemned an innocent person, that person would suffer
in hell to be true, so that the dependency required by condition (b) exists.
However, the following backtracking conditional also appears to be true:
if Charon had been going to condemn the innocent, God would not have entrusted
judgment to Charon. Charon is, in other words, subject to finkish backtracking.
Providential Anselmians are committed to the claim that these two conditionals are consistent, and that a being in such a situation—for instance,
Sue from the previous subsection—may be free. Charon’s situation differs
from Sue’s in just one way: Charon’s prevented option is necessarily prevented. Does this prevent Charon from satisfying condition (b)?
The answer is no. In the story described the outcome depends causally,
and hence explanatorily, on Charon’s choice.
The causal dependence is obvious. Within the structure of the created
world, Charon has the power to cause or causally prevent damnation, and
Charon exercises this power to prevent the damnation of the innocent.
Since causes explain their effects, it follows that it is because of Charon’s
choice that the innocent are not condemned.29
Given that it is metaphysically impossible that the innocent suffer in
hell, some may find it odd to suppose that, in the world described, the
innocent do not suffer in hell because Charon does not condemn them.
However, the structure here is less exotic than it might first appear. Sara
Bernstein argues that it is not uncommon for impossible omissions to figure into causal explanations, even in the actual world. Bernstein gives the
following examples:30
(a) If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2 + 2 = 5, children’s
math textbooks would not have remained the same.
(b) If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2 + 2 = 5, she would
not have failed to get a raise.
(c) If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2 + 2 = 5, her mentor would not have remained unimpressed.
It is important to Flint’s approach that there are possible worlds at which a number
of rather similar things happen. For instance, there are possible worlds at which Christ’s
Human Nature is not assumed and is therefore an ordinary human being and sins. There
are possible worlds at which Filbert is not pope and proclaims heresy (perhaps even in circumstances that would count as speaking ex cathedra if he were pope). And there are possible
worlds at which God overrides Pope Filbert’s free will to prevent him from proclaiming
heresy. But the same can be said about my Charon case, discussed below. For instance, there
are possible worlds at which Charon, after accepting a bribe, says to an innocent person “I
condemn you!” while falsely believing that this will result in that person being condemned.
29
Someone might worry that, since God’s providential plan provides the ultimate explanation of why the innocent do not suffer in hell, Charon’s choice does not provide a genuine
explanation. However, the providential Anselmian must deny that this kind of providential
explanation preempts ordinary creaturely explanation, or else she will not be able to maintain that created causes in general explain their effects. This denial is not implausible, since
God’s providential plan provides a very different kind of explanation than the creaturely
cause. See Pearce, “Foundational Grounding and the Argument from Contingency,” 255–256;
Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?” 163–166.
30
Bernstein, “Omission Impossible,” 2583–2584.
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In fact, another example of this phenomenon is of considerable real-world
importance. It is widely believed to be impossible to construct an efficient
algorithm for factoring the product of two large prime numbers.31 This
unproven mathematical conjecture is at the root of all modern cryptography, including the technology used to protect online financial transactions.
Thus: it is because no one has constructed an efficient algorithm for factoring the
product of two large prime numbers that online banking is reasonably secure.
Further, this explanatory claim supports counterpossible conditionals: if
computer hackers had not failed to construct an efficient algorithm for factoring
the product of two large primes, online banking would be laughably insecure.
One thing is exotic about Charon’s case (and God’s): Charon does not
perform the impossible action because, and only because, he chooses not
to. This is not the primary or only reason why people have not proved that
2 + 2 = 5 or constructed an efficient algorithm for factoring the product of
two large primes. Nevertheless, the idea that a person’s omitting to do the
impossible could explain features of a possible world (or even the actual
world) is not one we should balk at.
I conclude, then, that necessarily prevented options may nonetheless
be options (in the sense defined). Necessarily prevented options, however,
are impossible options.
3.3 Free Will Without Alternative Metaphysical Possibilities?
The providential Anselmian is committed to the claim that creatures, as
well as God, may have impossible options. However, if having an action
among one’s options is only necessary, and not sufficient, for being free
with respect to that action, then this does not automatically undermine
Almeida’s premise 3. What is needed is not the claim that condemning the
innocent is among Charon’s options, but rather the claim that Charon is
free to condemn the innocent. Can this gap be bridged?
The key here is that Charon’s situation turns out not to be so different
from (what the providential Anselmian takes to be) ordinary exercises of
providence. If God is able to prevent Sue from choosing Door #1 or Door
#2 while leaving Sue free, then there is no obvious reason why God should
not be able to prevent Charon from condemning the innocent while leaving him free.
The point is this: it’s not enough to point out that alternative possibilities are lacking. It matters why alternative possibilities are lacking. God’s
range of options, and God’s freedom, are not diminished by the fact that
God necessarily chooses against certain options. This theological view
undermines, or at least casts doubt on, the general intuition about alternative possibilities that motivates premise 3 of Almeida’s argument: it is
possible (at least in the case of God) that an agent may be free to do something which it is impossible that she do. Additionally, whatever form of
31
By an efficient algorithm we mean, more precisely, one that can be executed in
polynomial time.
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(direct or indirect) control God might exercise over creaturely free choices,
the fact that some of God’s choices in the exercise of this control are necessary does not seem to provide any new threat to free will. Charon lacks
alternative possibilities in precisely the same way and for precisely the
same reason as Sue, but the providential Anselmian is committed to the
claim that Sue may be free.
Almeida’s premise 3 was meant to be motivated by the intuition that
free will requires alternative possibilities. However, the providential
Anselmian has good reason to hold that, in at least some cases, God can
ensure that we do not choose certain options without making us unfree
with respect to those options. This means that the providential Anselmian
has already rejected the motivating intuition about alternative possibilities. The absence of alternative possibilities alone does not remove freedom; it matters why the possibilities are lacking.
Some providential Anselmians may simply insist, as a matter of brute
intuition, that free will requires at least alternative metaphysical possibilities, and morally significant freedom requires some of these alternative
metaphysical possibilities to involve wrongdoing. Alternatively, some
clever providential Anselmian may propose a different way of distinguishing Charon’s case from Sue’s and from God’s, that would explain
why Charon’s impossible options are insufficient for free will. I am not
prepared to offer a decisive refutation of these views. My present point
is that premise 1 of Almeida’s argument (divine necessity) undermines
the standard sources of intuitive support for premise 3 (the requirement
of alternative possibilities). As a result, Almeida’s argument does more to
highlight the apparent inconsistency in Anselmianism than to resolve it.
3.4 Open Theism and Impossible Options?
Open theism is the view that God lacks (certain) knowledge of future
contingents. Typically, open theism is motivated by the idea that God’s
knowledge would render these future events non-contingent, and hence
take away creaturely free will.32 I have just argued that providential
Anselmianism undermines Almeida’s premise (3). What, though, if the
Anselmian is an open theist?33
My argument for the claim that God has impossible options is fully
consistent with open theism. However, my argument from the claim that
God has impossible options to the claim that we may have impossible
options depends on the assumption that God can, at least sometimes, prevent us from making certain choices without taking away our options.
Further, my argument that we may be free with respect to certain impossible actions depended on the providential Anselmian’s commitment to
32
Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge; Hasker, “The Foreknowledge Conundrum”; Rissler,
“Open Theism,” §3.
33
In fact, an anonymous referee suggests that some readers may regard the results of this
paper so far as an argument in favor of open theism!
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the claim that this kind of providential control is consistent with human
freedom. Open theists generally reject these views.
What does this mean for my argument? In the first place, note that one
of the key selling points of Almeida’s response to the problem of evil was
that it was not supposed to rely on any controversial assumptions about
free will. However, if the possibility of impossible options undermines
the argument, then it turns out that the argument does depend on controversial assumptions about free will. Indeed, it will turn out, in this case,
that Almeida’s free will defense relies on a much stronger view of human
free will (and a correspondingly weaker view of divine providence) than
Plantinga’s Molinist defense.
In the second place, the argument from the claim that God may be free
to perform impossible actions to the claim that we may be free to perform
impossible actions is in fact more plausible on (most versions of) open theism than on many competing conceptions of God.
Open theists often promote their view as a biblicist and personalist conception of God. That is, (most versions of) open theism take God to be a
person in something very much like the way humans are persons. This is
supposed to be an advantage because it allows for a more straightforward
reading of various biblical narratives about God and it allows for a personal relationship with God in a straightforwardly literal sense.34 God is,
in other words, far more similar to us on (most) open theist views than on
the classical philosophical theology of someone like Aquinas.
Open theists often regard free will as a central component of personhood. Further, open theists often emphasize that their view allows God to
respond freely to our prayers.35 But I have argued that Anselmians—even
those who are open theists—must hold that the options among which God
freely chooses include some impossibilities. If divine and human freedom
are as similar as open theists suggest, then it seems difficult for the open
theist to rule out the possibility that the options among which we freely
choose may sometimes include impossibilities.
Admittedly this argument is merely suggestive. The open theist obviously does not think that God is exactly like us. Further, open theism does
not have the same mechanism for the generation of creaturely impossible
options that exists in stronger views of providence. Thus, we can say that,
while stronger views of providence are committed to the claim that we can
have impossible options and this is consistent with freedom, open theism
merely suggests that this might be the case. However, we may still say—
even on open theism—that Almeida’s Anselmian premise (1) casts doubt
on his premise (3), the alternative possibilities requirement for freedom.
The strength of this doubt will be directly proportional to the strength of
one’s theory of providence.

34
35

See Pinnock, et al. The Openness of God; Rissler, “Open Theism.”
Basinger, “Practical Implications;” Rissler, “Open Theism,” §4.
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4. The Anselmian Problem of Evil
The ramifications of these observations for Anselmian discussions of the
problem of evil are severe. The central commitment of Anselmianism,
expressed in premise 1 above, is an explanatory claim: this world is actual
because God chose that it be actual. Further, every possible world is such
that, had it been actual, it would have been actual because of God’s choice.
This seems to imply that the non-actuality of other worlds can be explained
in the same way: they are non-actual because God did not choose them
and actuality is conferred only by divine choice. Among those options
God did not choose, there are some that God necessarily did not choose
because of the decisive reasons against them.
This, however, is precisely the problem: the actual world has numerous
features that we would expect to count as decisive reasons against actualizing it. For instance, the presence of even a single genocide appears to
be a decisive reason against actualizing a world. In this world there were
several of these in the 20th century alone. On Anselmianism, if God has
decisive reason against actualizing this world, then this world is not so
much as possible. Yet, somehow, this world is actual.
Almeida’s response to this is as follows. God is able to actualize a world
at which creatures freely refrain from genocide. Yet no one freely refrains
from genocide unless it is possible that that person commits genocide, and
it is not possible that a person commit genocide unless it is possible that
God actualizes a world at which that person commits genocide.36 As we
have seen, though, there are reasons internal to Anselmianism for finding
this argument’s assumptions about freedom and possibility dubious.
The moral of the story is that the problem of evil for the Anselmian
is harder than Almeida takes it to be. The reason for this lies in the distinctive explanatory structure of Anselmianism, which takes divine choice
to be the root explanation of why things are as they are and takes this
explanatory structure to apply at every possible world. Anselmianism
is, in Timothy O’Connor’s phrase,37 a thesis about the necessary shape
of contingency. As a result of this commitment, it is insufficient for the
Anselmian to argue that this world is among God’s options.38 The charge
to which the Anselmian must reply is the charge that choosing this world
is inconsistent with the character that would be possessed by a maximally
great being. To this allegation, Almeida has offered no reply at all.39
Appendix: Does God have Logically Impossible Options?
In sections 1 and 2, I argued that the Anselmian is committed to the claim
that among God’s options are some impossibilities. However, this does
not (incoherently) imply that these impossibilities are possible. In this
Almeida, “Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense,” 63–67.
O’Connor, Theism and Ultimate Explanation.
38
In fact, in the Appendix below, I argue that even contradictions are among God’s options.
39
I thank Scott Hill and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a previous draft.
36
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appendix, I present a quick argument for the claim that even logical contradictions are among God’s options.
An adequate analysis of divine omnipotence should hold that, necessarily, God’s will is perfectly efficacious.40 In order for this view to be logically consistent, it must be held that it is impossible that God will logical
contradictions.41 However, it seems inappropriate, from the perspective of
Anselmian perfect being theology, to imagine logic as an unwanted constraint on God’s activity—to imagine, for instance, that God wishes that
there were round squares, but God just can’t bring Godself to make any. It
seems better, from an Anselmian perspective, to hold that God values or
endorses the laws of logic in such a way as to regard the fact that a state
of affairs contains a contradiction as a decisive reason against bringing
about that state of affairs.42 One way of expressing this view is to say that,
from God’s perspective absolutely nothing—not even a round square—is
intrinsically impossible. God, on this view, is the delimiter of possibilities
in such a strong sense that all impossibilities are ultimately explained by
the ways God’s character shapes God’s willing. If the Anselmian holds
this view, then she will be committed to claiming that all impossibilities
are in fact among God’s options.

Pearce and Pruss, “Understanding Omnipotence,” 405–409; Adams, “A New Paradox of
Omnipotence”; Pearce, “Counterpossible Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will”;
Byerly, “The All-Powerful, Perfectly Good, and Free God,” 23.
41
Pearce and Pruss, “Understanding Omnipotence,” 410; Pearce, “Counterpossible
Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will,” 7–8, 12. The argument for this claim
depends on a principle of counterfactual reasoning that Daniel Nolan (“Impossible
Worlds,” 550–551) has called the “Strangeness of Impossibility Condition.” Different
authors give this rule in either of two closely related formulations: ◊p, p ☐→ q ⊢ ◊q or
◊p, ☐q ⊢ p ☐→ q. On a “closest world” approach to counterfactuals, either formulation is
equivalent to the claim that every possible world is closer to the actual world than any
impossible world.
Either formulation clearly validates the inference in the text. Suppose that ◊(God wills
that 2 + 2 = 5) and ((God wills that 2 + 2 = 5) ☐→ 2 + 2 = 5). By the first formulation it
follows, absurdly, that ◊(2 + 2 = 5). Similarly, suppose that ◊(God wills that 2 + 2 = 5) and
☐¬(2 + 2 = 5). Then, by the second formulation, (God wills that 2 + 2 = 5) ☐→ ¬(2 + 2 = 5).
Thus, given the Strangeness of Impossibility Condition (on either formulation), the supposition that ◊(God wills that 2 + 2 = 5) is incompatible with the supposition that God
possesses perfect efficacy of will in the sense defined in Pearce and Pruss, “Understanding
Omnipotence,” 410.
Recently, some philosophers have questioned or rejected the Strangeness of Impossibility
Condition (e.g., Nolan, “The Extent of Metaphysical Necessity,” 330; Bernstein, “Omission
Impossible,” 2581–2582; Kocurek, “On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual
Reasoning”). However, the principle is either an axiom or a theorem in many accounts of
subjunctive conditionals, including those that allow for non-trivial counterpossibles. See,
e.g., Mares, “Who’s Afraid of Impossible Worlds?” 521–522; Berto et al., “Williamson on
Counterpossibles,” 697. The Strangeness of Impossibility Condition also plays a crucial role
in Marc Lange’s theory of modality, serving to differentiate the various species of necessity
(Lange, Laws and Lawmakers).
42
Pearce and Pruss, “Understanding Omnipotence,” 410–412; Pearce, “Counterpossible
Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will,” 12.
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Note that this view does not imply a radical Cartesian voluntarism on
which God arbitrarily invents the laws of logic.43 Indeed, the emphasis on
God’s reasons places it firmly in the (Leibnizian/Thomistic) intellectualist
camp.44 The claim is that, necessarily and prior to God’s creative decision,
God knows the laws of logic and values them in a way that guarantees
that God creates in accord with them. Thus, although this view implies the
non-trivial truth of the counterpossible conditional, if God were irrational
there might be true contradictions,45 it does not see the laws of logic as stemming from a divine decree. Rather, these laws are a result of the way God’s
intellect and character shape God’s willing.46
An alternative Anselmian view would hold that the divine understanding is so constituted as never even to consider intrinsically impossible states of affairs, so that these are excluded entirely from the weighing
of reasons. Perhaps some Anselmians will want to say that considering
whether it would be good or bad if there were round squares implies some
intellectual confusion or other form of imperfection.
It seems to me that this is a mistake. Philosophers engaged in debate
over whether the Anselmian God exists are up to our ears in non-trivial
counterpossible conditionals. If these are genuine propositions with truth
values, they should be within the scope of divine omniscience. Thus, God
knows how things would be if impossibilities were actual. This will include
knowledge of how things would be with respect to value if impossibilities were actual, and—at least for a perfectly good, perfectly rational, and
omnipotent being—the (dis)value of a state of affairs just is a reason for or
against it. Therefore, God considers reasons for and against even intrinsic
impossibilities, and intrinsic impossibilities are among God’s options.
This argument depends on two key assumptions: that God’s knowledge can be understood in propositional terms, and that subjunctive conditionals (including counterpossibles) express propositions with objective
truth values. Although these are both common assumptions in recent
analytic philosophy, both have been challenged.47 Nevertheless, this line
On Descartes’s voluntarism, see Descartes, Meditations, 294; Frankfurt, “The Logic
of Omnipotence”; Curley, “Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths”; Bennett,
“Descartes’s Theory of Modality.”
44
On Leibniz’s account of the dependence of the modal facts on God, see Adams, Leibniz,
ch. 7; Newlands, “Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility.”
45
See Pearce, “Counterpossible Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will,” 8.
46
Further note that this view is fully consistent with the standard modal system S5. God’s
impossible options are necessarily impossible, since the explanation for their impossibility is
to be found in a necessary feature of God’s character, and this necessity (like all necessities,
according to S4 and the strictly stronger S5) is a necessary necessity.
47
For non-propositional conceptions of divine knowledge, see Alston, “Does God
Have Beliefs?”; Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 59–62; Burrell, Freedom and Creation. For
“epistemicizing” accounts of subjunctive conditionals, which deny that they have objective truth values, see Edgington, “Counterfactuals”; Brogaard and Salerno, “Remarks on
Counterpossibles”; Vetter, “Counterpossibles (Not Only) for Dispositionalists,” §4; Kocurek,
“On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning,” §7.
43
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of argument shows that a collection of assumptions endorsed by many
contemporary Anselmians leads to an even stronger conclusion than the
one I defended in sections 1 and 2 above: even logically impossible states
of affairs, such as a round square’s existence, are among God’s options.
Contrary to first appearances, this conclusion, radical though it may be,
does not imply Cartesian voluntarism and does not require a revisionary
modal logic.
Trinity College Dublin
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